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 This research paper would not have been possible without the help of a 
considerable number of people. First and foremost, I must thank my SIT program director 
Mrs. Duong Van Thanh. To a foreigner, Vietnam can be quite a perplexing maze at 
times. Traveling, conducting research, and even ordering food in Vietnam can confound 
even the most ardent cosmopolitan. I can honestly say that I could not have had a better 
guide to Vietnam than Co Thanh. She seemed to have dozens of friends wherever we 
traveled, and always knew just the right people to put me in contact with when I was 
conducting my independent research. Her help in translating documents, as well as 
interviews, was immeasurable, and I cannot thank her enough for her help with general 
things like traveling during my research. 
 Additionally, I would like to thank my program assistant Vy Ho. Over the course 
of my stay in Vietnam, it was often hard to remember that Vy was actually a member of 
the SIT staff, and not a good friend to all of us on the program. Her help in organizing the 
group excursions and arranging travel plans for all of us was incredibly useful. I must 
also thank David Brown and Douglas Jardine for helping to guide me through the very 
harrowing world of research in Vietnam. Conducting research in Vietnam can be very 
difficult. Not only is there an immense language barrier, but there is also an objective 
truth barrier in historical writings. It was often hard to decipher what was historical fact, 
and what was often the Party’s interpretation of historical events, but David and Douglas 
helped greatly in continually giving suggestions as to which direction I should take my 
research.  
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 I would also like to thank the Mr. Tran Huu Chanh and the staff at the Cu Chi 
Tunnel complex for their insights into the world of the underground Viet Cong. Going 
into the Cu Chi Tunnels and actually seeing and feeling the small, cramped world that 
thousands of Vietnamese inhabited during the wars gave me more insight into the 
determination of the Vietnamese people than any document or memoir ever could. Most 
of my research could not have been done without the help of the staff at the numerous 
museums and libraries that I visited during my research period. Despite knowing chut 
chut Vietnamese, the staffs at these institutions were always able to, after must gesturing 
and broken Vietnamese, direct me to the resources that I needed. 
  Finally, and above all, I would like to thank the Vietnamese people. The 
generosity and hospitality of everyone in Vietnam was incredible, and this paper could 
not have been possible without it. I have never felt more welcomed than in the homes of 
the Viet Minh and North Vietnamese Army veterans, who were all extremely eager to 
share their stories and experiences with me. I always had a full cup of tea in front of me, 
and always left their homes with amazing stories and good memories. Their kindness and 




1. All interviews, except for with Tran Huu Chan, were conducted with the aid of 
translators. 
 
2. In Vietnamese, the family name is placed prior to the individuals name. For 
example, in the name Nguyen Van Thieu, “Nguyen” is the family name, and 
“Thieu” is the individual’s name. Nguyen is an extremely common family name 






 I. Introduction 
 
 By the time tanks of the North Vietnamese Army crashed through the gates of the 
Presidential Palace in Saigon to reunify the country in 1975, the United States had spent 
almost two hundred billion dollars and lost over 58,000 soldiers in Vietnam.
1
 From the 
late 1940’s until the fall of Saigon, the United States had been fervently trying to prevent 
a communist takeover in Vietnam, spending billions to help France retain her 
Indochinese colonies, and subsequently billions in aid to the successive governments of 
the southern Republic of Vietnam. Yet despite the massive spending and military 
superiority, the United States, like France before her, eventually had to withdraw from 
Vietnam. While Vietnamese today are hesitant to apply such definitive terms as “won and 
lost” to the result of the conflict (over fifty times as many North Vietnamese died in the 
war compared to American casualties), the perceived loss by American forces perplexed 
both the American military command and public. This perception illustrates an inherent 
and crucial flaw in American attitude during the war. Though the war obviously 
manifested itself as a military conflict, the underlying driving force of the Vietnamese 
resistance was overwhelmingly political and social. The Vietnamese Communist party 
was driven to gain as much popular support as possible, and render occupying forces 
politically neutral, while the masses of Vietnamese society finally grasped their ability to 
create lasting change in their country.  American commanders in Vietnam seemed 
ignorant of the almost spiritual attitude that many Vietnamese fought with, often trying to 
quantify the war in body counts and bombing missions. In 1968, the reporter I.F. Stone 
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wrote that American policy makers and commanders had no grasp of the true struggle 
being waged by the Vietnamese: 
In reading the military literature on guerilla warfare now so fashionable at the 
Pentagon, one feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from 
outside through heavy plate glass windows. They see the motions but they 
can’t hear the music. They put the mechanical gestures down on paper… But 
what rarely comes through to them are the injured racial feelings, the misery, 
the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration and the 
desperation. So they cannot understand what leads men to abandon wife, 
children, home… to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than 





Trying to break the Vietnamese resistance against the French and American forces down 
into troop numbers and tactical capabilities, as both countries tried to do, is simply an 
impossibility. To do so would negate the menagerie of forces that coalesced and 
combined to create the Vietnamese resistance movement that lasted for thirty years, and 
fall victim to the same trappings that ensnared French and American policy. This research 
paper is thus not a chronology of events and compilation of figures, but rather an analysis 
of the mentality, tactics, and motivations of the entire resistance movement, from the 
peasant to the soldier to the president. Through interviews, memoirs, museum visits, 
poems, art, propaganda, and historical documents, I will show that the Vietnamese 
resistance movement during throughout both wars was an extremely well-planned effort 
that effectively wove together political, social, and military strategies to mobilize an 
entire population for three decades of intense warfare.  
II. Entrenched Politics 
 Vietnam could very easily be called one of the greatest ideological battlefields in 
human history. Given the wide range of ideologies that came into direct conflict in 
Vietnam during the middle of the 20
th
 century, the resistance, at its core, must be 
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considered a political struggle. A vast majority of the country in the 20
th
 century was still 
of the peasant-agricultural class, indebted to land-lords who wielded an inordinate 
amount of power under the auspices of the French colonialists. Many of Ho Chi Minh’s 
policies during the resistance were targeted at giving land to back to the peasants, in an 
effort to replace this feudal state with a more ideal socialist republic. Additionally, 
Vietnamese nationalism and communism came into direct confrontation on the 
battlefields of the country with French colonialism, and later American capitalism and 
imperialism. The importance of politics in shaping Vietnam’s future was not lost on 
President Ho Chi Minh, who unequivocally led the country through both the French and 
American wars until his death in 1969. Beginning in 1911, Ho Chi Minh, then using his 
birth-name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, traveled the world, living and working in Paris, New 
York, London, and Moscow, all the while attending communist meetings and petitioning 
local governments for the independence of Vietnam.
3
 In Moscow, Ho Chi Minh became 
very active in the Comintern, often sitting in as a delegate of Indochina. This work in 
Moscow, as well as the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to address the needs of colonial 
peoples, would have a profound effect on Ho Chi Minh’s thought as to the liberation of 
all colonies: “Ho Chi Minh learned something from the failure… national salvation could 
not be generated from the old political system, nor could it be fostered by relying on 
support from the new Eastern powers”
4
. Ho Chi Minh concluded that there needed to be a 
complete upheaval among all members of society to throw off the old systems of French 
colonialism. Realizing that Vietnam would receive little external help in its quest for 
independence, the shape of the revolution would necessitate the input from every citizen 
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of Vietnam: “A nation which does not rely on its own effort but only waits for another 
country to come to its aid is not worthy of independence… we must rely on our own 
efforts”
5
. The political mantra of self-reliance would echo throughout all facets of the 
resistance, and only by joining together all parts of Vietnamese society, not just the 
military, could the yoke of French colonialism be completely shed.  
In 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared that “to bring the resistance to a successful end, 
we must mobilize all our forces… the farmer in his rice field, the worker engrossed in his 
job at the factory, the petty tradeswoman… this is what is called the entire people’s 
resistance”
6
. Propaganda throughout the entire resistance movement would echo this 
theme of entire’s people’s resistance, as well as the communist doctrine of union of 
agriculture and industry. In an exhibition of propaganda art in Hanoi, I came across a 
poster from 1967, displaying a smiling man working in a factory next to an equally happy 
woman carrying a bundle of wheat from the fields. The caption under them reads “Cach 
Mang Goi Ta VaoTran Moi!” which translates into “Revolution Calls For A New Kind of 
Combat!”. Every sector of Vietnamese society, including the economy, would have to 
become a weapon to fight the enemy. The mobilization of both the industrial and 
agriculture masses in Vietnam would serve a twofold purpose: First, it would give the 
resistance the much needed popular support if it was to stage an offensive against an 
overwhelmingly more powerful military; second, it would cut off the French from their 
economic and political base. As Ho Chi Minh wrote in 1934, “modern imperialism is 
built on the exploitation of millions of working people in colonies and semi-colonies. 
That is why it will be demolished totally and for ever only when we succeed in 
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destroying that solid basis”
7
. The necessity for popular support would be a strong 
undercurrent in the strategies of the Communist Party of Vietnam throughout the wars of 
resistance. 
 In order to gain the support of every possible citizen of Vietnam not somehow 
intrinsically linked to the French or American occupiers, Ho Chi Minh had to bring 
together an extremely broad coalition of Vietnamese society. This necessitated that some 
aims of the Party be placed aside in order to accomplish the task at hand: liberation of the 
country. In a Party document from May of 1941, the leaders of the Party resolved that 
national liberation comes before any other aim: 
During this period of time, the interest of the group, of the classes should be 
placed under the survival of the nation… if we cannot solve the priority of 
national liberation; not taking back the independence and freedom for the whole 
nation, then the whole nation could be seen as the lives of horses and buffalos, 






The communist tenet of the dissolution of class and social hierarchies had to take a back 
seat to the importance of independence. If the country could not be liberated, then there 
would be no possibility for class liberation either. The Party needed to utilize every single 
aspect of Vietnamese society to expel the French, even including what the Party would 
refer to as the bourgeois class. In his July, 1947 review of the first six months of open 
resistance against the French, Ho Chi Minh states that the “rich people devoting their 
talent and efforts to develop their factories and exploit their land are also doing their 
part”
9
. For the time being, the Communist Party was willing to set aside its differences 
with capitalist forces in Vietnam in order to defeat the greater threat of colonialism. 
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Vietnam, however, did not only contain a wide range of social and economic classes. The 
thousands of years of Chinese and French occupation had left Vietnam with a menagerie 
of religious sects, and there was much outreach towards these groups. The Party 
promised the large population of Buddhists that the religious oppression of the Catholic 
French colonialists would be put to an end. Additionally, numerous leaders in the 
Catholic Church were invited to participate in the Party conference of 1949.
10
 The ability 
to bring together many disparate groups in Vietnamese society showed the absolute unity 
among many Vietnamese for the liberation and independence of their country. This broad 
base of support would prove to be the resistance movement’s greatest strength. 
The importance of a massive political base for the resistance was essential. It was 
common knowledge in the upper echelons of the Vietnamese command that the 
revolution would not succeed if it was conducted solely as a military operation. The 
overwhelming force of the foreign nations that occupied Vietnam would easily crush a 
combative movement if it did not have a strong base. Thus, military matters always 
played a secondary role to that of politics.
11
 When Ho Chi minh ordered General Vo 
Nguyen Giap to organize the Viet Minh, the first manifestation of an organized 
revolutionary force, in 1944 to oppose the Japanese occupiers, he stressed that the 
wording be the “Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army”, showing the primary role 
that propaganda and politics would play in the struggle for national liberation.
12
 In order 
to build up the military base necessary to fight foreign occupiers, first a strong political 
base had to be created. Throughout the entire resistance, the Communist Party would 
send thousands of political cadres into villages throughout Vietnam to stir up resentment 
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towards the administrative government, and turn their political support toward the 
communists. Even during the inter-war period, these infiltration agents would play a 
crucial role in communist strategy. As Ho Chi Minh stated in 1956, “success or failure 
depends on the capability of [political] cadres because they decide everything. Their 
training is the Party’s essential work”
13
. These political cadres would go to great lengths 
to integrate themselves into the community, and level of commitment would serve to help 
foster a sense of identification with the Party among the most remote locales.  
Though foreign occupiers would often go to great lengths to seal villages off from 
communist forces (the American strategy of “strategic hamlets” is a famous example) 
political cadres of the Communist Party of Vietnam would often infiltrate small 
communities to give talks on politics and communism. A former Viet Cong soldier in the 
American War, Vu Hy Thieu, recounts how “every night we infiltrated those hamlets… 
we had to explain to them why we opposed the programs and crimes of the enemy”
14
.  
Involvement with the villagers would provide the army not only a strategic foothold, but 
also an incredibly important sense of unity between the population and the party. Cadres 
were often from the same areas and of the same ethnicities as the villagers, and 
additionally, would go to extensive lengths to gain their support. In his journal, Nguyen 
Van Thieu, a National Liberation Front officer active in South Vietnam during the 
1960’s, wrote that “to become accepted by the national minorities, our cadres have not 
only learned the language; they have also pierced their ears or filed their teeth if that is 
the custom of the minority in question”
15
. This effort to identify with indigenous people 
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did not extend solely to soldiers on the ground. General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of 
all forces during both wars, recalls learning three different indigenous languages over the 
course of his command, and Ho Chi Minh’s statement to him that “with regard to the 
people, if the army can win their affection… it will surely win victory”
16
. Over 80% of 
the population in Vietnam during the wars lived in small villages and hamlets, and thus 
by creating a sense of identification with members of the resistance movement, the 
revolutionary forces were able alienate large amounts of support for the government. 
However, though the affection of villagers could be attained by Viet Minh and Viet Cong 
cadres through political talks, often more concrete measures were necessary to cement 
the support of the populace. 
Political talks and piercing ones ears may show that the Party had a sense of unity 
with a local populace, but in order to gain the active support of the people, the Viet Minh 
and Viet Cong realized that they would in turn have to show the people their support. 
One of the first acts of the newly-formed Viet Minh in 1944 was to seize large supplies of 
Japanese rice stocks. Like much of the Pacific during World War Two, Vietnam had been 
exploited to serve the Japanese war machine. Between 1941 and 1944, Vietnam exported 
3.5 million tons of rice to Japan, resulting in a terrible famine that killed almost two 
million Vietnamese.
17
 Helping the famished populations of Vietnam would be the first of 
many initiatives among the resistance movement to help the masses: “Seizing the 
Japanese rice stocks to save the famished population was a new and humanitarian form of 
struggle, having a deep significance in the development of the revolutionary 
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. Additionally, throughout both wars, the revolutionary government would 
seek to intrinsically tie their struggle with that of agriculture, as much of their base lived 
in rural areas. Other posters at the propaganda exhibition encouraged farmers and 
peasants to increase yield as much as possible, using such catchy slogans as “Grow food 
for the state to provide for army to achieve victory!”. Soldiers in the army would often 
help out with seasonal harvests of rice, helping to bring the populace and Party together: 
“Our army and militia were responsible for fighting the enemy and helping people 
harvest and hide crops… the [revolutionary] government reduced land rents by 25 
percent and divided abandoned land among poor peasants which brought them closer to 
the regime”
19
. Though communist troops could win the affection and support of people of 
the villages, often most of the political and economic power resided within the French 
and later South Vietnamese appointed district chiefs and officials. They controlled both 
the local police force, as well taxes, and were often the most visible ground level 
representation of foreign domination. 
For the North Vietnamese during the 1950’s, destroying the local political 
figureheads of villages was an utmost priority. The people were for the most part in 
alliance with the communist, but these chiefs and officials still wielded most of the local 
power. By eliminating these local chiefs, the occupying force would lose its last vestige 
of authority in an area: “the masses quickly discovered that the most dangerous and also 
weakest link in the enemy’s coercion system at the village level was the hamlet chief. If 
this link was done away, the forces of repression would be blinded”
20
. The importance of 
eliminating the local chiefs was not lost on the command in Hanoi, which had been 
                                                 
18
 Ho Chi Minh Thought on the Military, 131 
19
 Giap, 93 
20
 The Thirty Year War, 42 
 13 
sending thousands of political cadres south to upset Ngo Dinh Diem’s grasp on power, 
even shortly after the 1954 armistice signing. In 1956, the communist leaders in the north 
gave explicit orders to these political cadres to carry out political assassinations of these 
chiefs and officials, and it is estimated that during the latter half of the 1950’s, there were 
over two thousand politically motivated killings in the south of Vietnam.
21
 These 
assassinations were also explicitly ordered to be carried out with knives instead of guns 
and bombs, which could produce innocent bystanders and alienate the public from the 
revolutionary forces. The lack of political oversight left the ruling government of Ngo 
Dinh Diem authoritatively neutered, exercising very little direct control outside of major 
cities. This was very similar to what happened to the French administrators during the 
first war, who increasingly found themselves forced to legiferer dans le vide (legislate in 
the void), enacting policies that received absolutely no traction at the ground level. By 
effectively winning over the support of the rural populace, as well as cutting off the 
villages from the ruling administration, the revolutionary movement was able to create a 
solid political base to use as a springboard toward other goals. 
In revolutionary wars such as the conflict in Vietnam, as shown previously, the 
people themselves can become political weapons, destroying the legitimacy of any 
imposed government. Eqbal Ahmad, a member of the Institute of Policy Studies, wrote in 
1970 that in revolutionary warfare, “the people are… objects of policy, a means rather to 
an end, a manipulable [sic], malleable mass whose behavior toward the government is 
more important that their feelings and attitudes”
22
. Though the Communist Party of 
Vietnam did not regard the masses in a manipulative way, they definitely did view them 
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as a means to an end. The revolution could only succeed with the help of the masses, and 
further more, victory could only be attained by the decisiveness of military action. Ho 
Chi Minh knew this, and stated in 1944, that “if we want to fight the French and 
Japanese, there must be armed combatants. But who wants to volunteer to carry rifles? If 
we want to win, we must have politically conscious masses who will volunteer to carry 
rifles”
23
. The conflict could not be one waged solely by destroying the legitimacy of the 
government. Military action had to supplement the political work in villages and cities for 
any dramatic changes to occur, and these politically conscious soldiers would form the 
foundation of the ever expanding revolutionary forces.  
III. Fighting Under Siege  
In order to fight an overwhelming military force such as the French or American 
armies, the soldiers of the Vietnamese revolutionary forces (this phrase includes the Viet 
Minh, the Viet Cong, and the regular North Vietnamese Army) had to be completely 
committed to and aware of the Party doctrine. Political education continued for soldiers 
throughout the war, and all battalions were led by a military officer and a political 
commissar. A soldier in the Viet Minh from the start of the resistance, Ngo Van Chieu 
writes in 1947 that "our political education concentrates on the misdeeds of colonialism 
and capitalism... I now know why we must support the government, and I am no longer a 
member of the popular army simply out of blind, stubborn patriotism and a hunger for 
glory"
24
. The political education of combatants, however, did not extend to just the 
soldiers on the front lines. Every aspect of the resistance movement, from the lowest 
transport agent to generals, received regular political lessons to reinforce their 
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commitment. Nguyen Huu An, a Senior Lieutenant General of forces in South Vietnam, 
recalls how as much as twenty percent of strategic staff meetings among senior 
commanders was devoted to political discussion.
25
 A group of four female veterans that I 
interviewed in Hanoi (Nguyen Thi Hoa, Le Thi Van, Nguyen Thi Thanh, and Doan Thi 
Qui) who had worked on the Ho Chi Minh trail, all recount that though often they were 
extremely underequipped for their duties, "[they] were fully equipped with thought and 
the correct political path... the political commissar was a kind man, and he passed on 
information and thought orally to the soldiers, and there were many discussions". By 
fully equipping the soldiers and personnel in the army with correct political thought, the 
Communist Party was able to successfully create a force that had an undying loyalty to 
the cause. Only complete loyalty was necessary for the army to survive, for its first few 
years of resistance against the French would not only prove extremely arduous, but also 
shape the military strategy of the resistance for the next two decades.  
In order to wage an effective fight against the French, the Viet Minh leadership 
realized very early on that the commanders would have to have extremely flexible tactics 
and strategies to cope with the necessary maturation of the army. The Viet Minh was still 
in its infancy when the uprising was ordered on December 19th, 1946, and thus would 
have to go through many changes before it became a fully capable fighting force. 
Surveying the disparity between French and Vietnamese forces at the outbreak of the 
war, General Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that "despite the small numerical discrepancy [in 
troop levels], the difference in organization, equipment technical expertise was great- it 
marked an epochal backwardness on our part"
26
. Most of the weapons in the Vietnamese 
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arsenal were either captured French or Japanese rifles, or weapons given to the Viet Minh 
by the American OSS during World War Two, and numbered less than five thousand.
27
 
To keep the overwhelming might of the French army from crushing the young Viet Minh, 
everything had to be done to delay French advances and build up the army. By building 
up the army, the Viet Minh could shift to more effective tactics. Between 1946 and 1951, 
the Viet Minh went through three recognizable phases of strategic combat: insurgency, 
guerrilla warfare, and then mobile-guerrilla warfare. Each phase built off of the one 
before it, and the insurgency movement in 1946-47 would prove to one of the most 
important phases of the entire resistance war. 
 Before the first shot was fired against French forces, there was consensus among 
leaders of the Viet Minh that the resistance war could not be won quickly, but rather must 
focus on grinding down the enemy for a substantial period of time. The longer the war, 
the less the possibility for victory for the enemy, and the more support in the foreign 
nation would dwindle. Ho Chi Minh stated that “our resistance needs to be protracted 
because our country is not large, not densely populated, and moreover, it is poor”
28
. In 
this fight for independence, time would prove one of the most valuable assets for the 
Vietnamese. To prepare the population for a long war, material and foodstuffs began to 
be stockpiled. A ten-year supply of salt was stolen from a French compound in March of 
1946, and hidden in the central highlands.
29
 An incredible amount of importance was 
placed on outlasting the enemy, and turning Vietnam into a completely un-winnable 
situation. Referring to the strategy or rural insurgency and guerrilla warfare, General Vo 
Nguyen Giap wrote that “If these actions become generalized, they would consume the 
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strength of the expeditionary corps and turn Vietnam into a bottomless abyss for the 
French”
30
. The need for a long, drawn-out war was evident to all leaders of the Viet 
Minh, and in order to build up the troops to wage a protracted war for independence, 
soldiers would first have to resort to insurgent tactics to delay French advances as long as 
possible. 
In late 1946, most of the French forces were concentrated in large northern cities 
such as Hanoi, Hai Phong, and Hue. When tensions finally came to a head on December 
19
th
, the primary responsibility of the revolutionary forces was to try to keep the French 
inside of the cities for as long as possible, so that the Viet Minh could regroup and 
organize in the countryside: “In the beginning, we will try to wear down the enemy… and 
preserve our strength by pinning down and isolating the French troops for as long as 
possible in each city, thereby giving our people time to prepare for a lasting war”
31
. Viet 
Minh soldiers were tasked with keeping the French pinned down in cities for at least a 
month, buying precious time for the troops in the country side. To fulfill this mission, 
soldiers resorted to a wide variety of insurgent tactics, all aimed at slowing French 
advances, and incapacity the army in any way. In Hanoi in particular, thousands of road 
blocks were set up, combat trenches dug, and holes punched through walls of houses and 
stores to allow soldiers to pass through. French forces were stationed in the old imperial 
citadel, which lay in the direct heart of Hanoi. This resistance-infrastructure would cause 
the French to have to “fight for every house to break out of the city”
32
. Additionally, 
sabotage was resorted to, in an effort to deny French forces as many resources as 
possible. The signal to initiate an offence against the French in Hanoi was the destruction 
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by bomb of the Yen Phu power plant, cutting power to the city and providing the Viet 
Minh a cover of darkness. At the same time, bombs ripped through petrol depots 
throughout the city, as well as the rail station, and in Saigon, rice mills and rubber 
factories were burned to the ground. However, a bomb planted on the Long Bien bridge 
failed to destroy the bridge, leaving the French a vital lifeline out of the city. It would be 
a full two months before the French were able to take full control of the city, twice as 
long as the soldiers had been ordered. For the next few months, until the late spring of 
1947, the Viet Minh would rely primarily on insurgent attacks, sabotaging key 
infrastructure and creating “general disturbance” for the French, all the while building up 
their own strength for the next stage of the resistance. 
Keeping the French inside of cities was only a stop-gap measure taken to mature 
Viet Minh forces. Fighting the French in any massive battles would have been suicide at 
such an early stage, and thus the Viet Minh realized that the only way to fight was to 
apply guerrilla tactics of ambushes and pitched, small scale battles in addition to their 
general campaign of sabotage. “In brief, we must avoid deploying large forces in large 
battles and instead cause difficulty and embarrassment to the enemy by means of many 
small victories”
33
. Fighting by guerrilla means meant that the Viet Minh would constantly 
be on the offensive, initiating small scale battles and ambushes on unsuspecting French 
convoys. This tactic of an unceasing offensive mixed with many small battles would 
remain a mainstay of Vietnamese tactics throughout the entire resistance war. In a 
document from the famously leaked Pentagon Papers, an assessment of all engagements 
between American and Vietnamese soldiers found that only 14% of all engagements were 
fought with the U.S. forces having some prior knowledge of the enemy’s location and 
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initiating combat. Vietnamese offences accounted for over 75% of all encounters, with a 
majority being an organized ambush on American transports or patrols.
34
 Attacks on 
French and American transports would be prove highly successful for guerrilla soldiers. 
Transport was generally the weakest point in an enemy’s organization, as convoys could 
be small and far away from bases and reinforcements. Additionally, by destroying the 
lead vehicle in a convoy, a small force of soldiers could pin down a much larger force. 
During the French war, the northern Highway Four came under attack so often that it 
became known as la route de sang, or “the road of blood”
35
. Over 12% of engagements 
between U.S. forces and Vietnamese occurred as helicopters were deploying troops to the 
battlefield, leading to the phrase ‘hot landing zone’. One well placed rocket-propelled 
grenade could destroy a whole helicopter and the unit inside. Strategies such as ambushes 
and pitched battles provided Vietnamese with relatively few casualties in engagements, 
as they always almost fought from a fortified or advantageous spot, concealed by thick 
jungle foliage. Ho Chi Minh, always quick with a metaphor, would often reiterate the 
need for an advantageous position by stating:  
If a one-kilogram weight was placed in a favorable position, its strength 
develops manifold and it is capable of raising a hundred kilogram object. This is 
an instance of the victory of position over strength… If a chess-player makes a 
bad move, he will lose even if with two rooks. Under favorable circumstances, a 




The use of good position necessitates a thorough knowledge of the surrounding terrain. 
Whenever possible, Viet Minh and Viet Cong soldiers were stationed in their own home 
provinces and districts, or at the very least had a local guide. This not only ensured an 
inbred knowledge of terrain and strategic points, but also negated the lack of resources of 
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the armies, as many soldiers could be sheltered and fed by their own families.
37
 Guerrilla 
attacks not only hampered enemy efforts at limited cost to Vietnamese soldiers, but 
would often net the guerrillas valuable captured weapons. However, the effect of small-
scale operations was minimal compared to the decisiveness of larger, battalion and 
division sized battles. These captured munitions would help to push the resistance 
movement into the next phase of battle. 
 Up until 1949, the Vietnamese had been fighting French forces primarily with 
guerrilla tactics, where timing and position were the deciding factors for victory. Never 
did Vietnamese firepower equal that of the French. However, by 1949, Vietnamese forces 
had captured enough guns and gained enough manpower to begin larger assaults on 
fortified positions. The generals in the Viet-Minh referred to this new tactic as 'Mobile-
Guerrilla' warfare, combining the successfulness of guerrilla tactics with the might of 
larger and better equipped forces.
38
 This new strategy was mainly applied in two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, guerilla fighters would ambush a convoy or surprise attack 
an enemy position and withdraw, scattering the enemy, and having them give chase to the 
guerrillas. The confusion among the enemy then served as a perfect strategic situation for 
larger forces to mop up: “Thus, guerrillas could annihilate the enemy, creating a battle 
array favorable to us, forcing the enemy to scatter their forces and get bogged down in 
passive positions, creating opportunity for our regular army to deal violent blows…”
39
. 
The second strategy by which mobile-guerilla warfare was employed was an effective 
combination of the guerilla capability of ambush, and the excessive manpower of a 
regular army. The Viet Minh army regulars would lay siege to an enemy strong-hold, 
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drawing reinforcements towards the area to help the besieged French troops. Guerrilla 
fighters would then ambush these transports, causing more losses for the French. This 
tactic was applied throughout much of the northwest, and carried through to the 
American war. Nguyen Huu An stated that he often used this tactic against American 
ground troops and their airborne reinforcements: “Our combat guidelines were to fight 
from small to medium scale, kill part of the enemy, and strive to shoot down plenty of 
their reinforcing aircraft”
40
. However, larger forces also highlighted the often crippling 
inability for the resistance to provide for its soldiers. General Nguyen Huu An describes 
that before any operation involving large operations, “one of the big questions always 
was: ‘Do we have enough rice?’”
41
. Though operations involving large numbers of troops 
were often unsustainable for extended periods of time, the tactic of guerilla-mobile 
warfare would form the basis of military strategy for the rest of the war. By combining 
large and small scale operations, the Vietnamese could apply pressure on enemy forces in 
every aspect of battle. 
 The ability of the Viet Minh to begin using larger forces resulted in one of the 
most profound and influential strategies of the war. Surveying the army's newfound 
ability to attack larger forces, general Vo Nguyen Giap developed the concept of 
‘Independent Companies, Concentrated Battalions'. Though still within the canon of 
mobile-guerilla warfare, this new concept allowed for an extreme degree of flexibility for 
Vietnamese forces: "Independent companies must be sent out to form a core fighting 
force and promote general guerrilla warfare. The main force battalions would carry out 
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mobile fighting in each locality and along major communication lines"
42
. This tactic 
would not only force the enemy to fight both large and small attacks, but also provide 
commanders with an extreme amount of flexibility. By being independent of direct orders 
from the chain of command, company commanders in the field were free to apply tactics 
that they deemed appropriate to battlefield conditions. Company commanders were 
generally given the guideline to "harass and annihilate small parts of the enemy forces, to 
carry out local sabotages, and to help with armed propagation work"
43
, and then left to 
their own devices to carry out these tasks. Nguyen Cao Phan, commander of a company 
of about 150 soldiers during the American war, told me that he rarely used orders from 
central command. Instead, he told me that they would "use on-site strategies, and fully 
utilize guerrilla tactics to fight the enemy. The two tactics we used frequently when 
confronting soldiers were Cai Ram Luc and Nam That Lung Tried". These two tactics 
mean, respectively, 'to enmesh yourself in enemy lines' and 'to fight by the enemy's belt', 
and both point to how guerrilla fighters negated many of the strategic advances of 
American forces. By being small and highly mobile, guerrilla fighters could enmesh with 
American forces for close quarters combat, destroying any pretense of battle lines. These 
tactics thus negated American air superior, for American soldiers would be too entangled 
with the Vietnamese to order an artillery strike or air bombardment. The 'Independent 
Companies, Concentrated Battalions' tactic would prove perhaps the most successful 
tactic in Vietnamese strategy, as it was almost constantly applied for the next two 
decades. While companies could fight with limited resources and weapons, battalions 
need much larger firepower to produce decisive victories. 
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 The introduction of mobile-guerilla warfare into the Viet Minh army would prove 
to have a profound effect on the military, and became a self-accelerating force. The more 
weapons guerrillas seized, the larger the regular army became, and the more capable the 
as a whole Viet Minh became at capturing and holding land. The enhanced capability of 
the regular army allowed it to fight the large kind of battles that produced decisive 
victories. The battle at Dong Khe in September of1950 would prove to be one of the most 
decisive of the war, as it not only resulted in the first major French defeat, but also 
provided a crucial lifeline for the Viet Minh to Chinese boder, where vast amounts of 
supplies and aid waited. In February of 1950, Ho Chi Minh visited Moscow, where he 
was able to secure the support of both the Soviet Union and the newly formed Peoples 
Republic of China: "Stalin… agreed to provide some aid to the Viet Minh troops, more 
specifically a regiment of 37mm anti-aircraft guns, several Molotov trucks, and some 
medicine. In addition, China would arm one infantry division and an artillery unit. The 
Soviet aid would be conveyed through China"
44
. This aid would greatly increase the Viet 
Minh tactical capability, and the numbers of downed French aircraft would increase each 
year following Dong Khe- over 435 aircraft were captured or destroyed. It was in fact the 
Viet Minh new-found capability to down French aircraft and direct artillery led to the 
defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu.
45
 Isolated in the northwest, Dien Bien Phu's 
only lifeline for reinforcements was by air, and General Vo Nguyen Giap made sure to 
deny the French any air superiority- over forty French aircraft were shot down during the 
two month siege, and thousands of shells were lobbed onto the French encampment. 
Foreign aid would play a large role in Vietnamese strategy during the American war as 
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well. Lacking the industrialization necessary for a domestic air force, the North 
Vietnamese had to rely entirely on Soviet aid to combat American jets and bombers. The 
grounds of the Military History Museum in Hanoi are littered with Mig 19s and Mig 21s, 
as well as a wide range of Soviet surface to air missiles. Though foreign aid would go a 
long way toward helping Vietnam defeat both the French and Americans, it was by no 
means the decisive factor. The true strength of the revolutionary movement lay in the 
determination of every Vietnamese behind it. Though only a small part of the Vietnamese 
population was capable of carrying rifles and marching long distances, there was a 
support network of tens of millions behind them, ensuring victory. As Ho Chi Minh 




IV. Every Village A Fortress, Every Citizen A Combatant 
 To defeat the French colonialists, the massive support of every single citizen of 
Vietnam was necessary. Throughout the entire resistance movement, there existed a 
mentality that the fight was not just on the shoulders of soldiers on the frontlines, but on 
the shoulders of every single citizen who worked towards national independence.  In 
reviewing the uprising against the French, Ho Chi Minh explicitly states that "each 
citizen is a combatant... each village is a combat trench... and twenty million Vietnamese 
are determined to smash these few thousand reactionaries"
47
. This solidarity would prove 
to be one of the resistance movement’s greatest assets. If the people in the villages were 
not able to actively fight, they could support the war in other means by giving soldiers 
shelter, information, and carrying out acts of sabotage to hinder the enemy. These 
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masses, finally politically awakened and actively involved in the resistance, would be a 
great thorn in the side of the occupying forces.   
 The resistance war against the French and American occupants would be a 
conflict waged almost entirely in the rural countryside. Because of the overwhelming 
might of the foreign war machines, it became necessary to hide regular troops and 
guerrilla fighters wherever possible. The mountainous, jungle terrain of Vietnam served 
to hide troops well, but in more agricultural terrain, other measures had to be taken: "In 
the plains, there are no mountains and forests, but there are mountains and seas of people. 
Thus if all the people are of the same mind, guerrilla fighters can hide among the people 
and act in absolute secrecy"
48
. The ability to vanish into the populace would be a useful 
trick in the arsenal of revolutionary guerrilla fighters, confounding many of their 
uniform-wearing enemies. In fact, many of the uniforms handed out by North Vietnam 
during the American war were intended to look exactly like peasant clothing. A weapons 
transport convoy on the Gianh River were given clothes and fishing nets identical to that 
of the local fisherman, as well as fishing permits bearing the signature of the local 
commissioner.
49
 In addition to providing the ability to hide guerrilla warriors, villages 
and hamlets went to great lengths to help and support these fighters. When one of his 
soldiers was wounded, Dang Vu Hiep, a commander of North Vietnamese troops in 
South Vietnam in the 1960's, recalls how "a young woman from the Benai ethnic 
minority wounded herself so that she could go to the enemy post and ask for medicine, 
which she brought back to treat the wounded soldier"
50
. Stories of sacrifice like this are 
not uncommon during the resistance movement. Many times, villagers would sacrifice 
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their own lives before betraying any knowledge to government agents. The story of the 
peasant Nguyen Huy Coung became famous all over Vietnam during the fight against the 
French. When enemy agents were informed that Mr. Nguyen was hiding troops in 
dugouts hidden on his property, they ordered him to show them the guerrilla's location. 
Mr. Nguyen refused, and every fifteen minutes, the agents killed one of his children. Mr. 
Nguyen still refused, and eventually laid down his own life after all three of his children 
were dead.
51
 Acts of sacrifice such as this show the absolutely level of devotion that 
many villagers had to the cause of national liberation, impeding occupying forces in 
whatever way they could and helping the resistance fighters. However, much of the 
support of fighters did not involve self-sacrifice, but rather a kind of familial affection for 
these young men.  
 In the Museum of Vietnamese Women in Hanoi, there is a special section devoted 
to the "Heroic War Mothers". Many of the now septua-and-octogenarian women have 
been praised by the Vietnamese government for giving birth to as many children as 
possible (some mothers had up to twelve) to sustain the war effort. However, some of the 
women conferred the title had no children during the war, but rather treated soldiers as if 
they were their own children. The wars tore families apart, as many young men had to 
travel hundreds of miles on foot away from home, and villages realized that these soldiers 
needed a warm familial atmosphere. Ngo Vanh Chieu, wrote that "the War Mothers are 
usually elderly women who take it upon themselves to adopt a soldier in the popular 
army... should it happen that the 'adoptive son's' unit be dispersed by an enemy attack, he 
can seek out the family, who will provide him with shelter... [and] vouch for him to the 
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. These war mothers served to strengthen the bonds of class 
solidarity between the army and the people. When a mother can care for a soldier like a 
son, her stake in the war effort becomes personal. Additionally, the institution of war 
mothers brought a great sense of unity among disparate villages, for these mothers knew 
that their children would be receiving the same kind of care from someone else.
53
 The 
housing and care of soldiers definitely went beyond a duty of the villagers, and became a 
show of absolute affection for the soldiers. When I interviewed Nguyen Loung Phuc, a 
regular in the North Vietnam Army during the American war, in Hanoi in 2009, he 
recalled how "whenever my unit had to move out of Long An province, the villagers 
were always sad, and so were we. We became very close with the families, and missed 
them while fighting. The villagers loved us, and we loved them". Though the level of 
affection between soldiers and villagers gave a great morale boost to all sides, often 
housing soldiers was not enough, and many villagers took up arms against the enemy by 
any means they could. 
 Though Ho Chi Minh would often state that Marxism-Leninism was more 
powerful than bombs and bullets, the political will of the people had to be translated into 
action. Vietnam, however, was still a primarily agricultural society, and access to 
industrial weapons such as grenades or rifles was extremely limited- one Viet Minh 
veteran that I interviewed stated that his first weapon was a flint-lock rifle from 
Napoleonic times. To counter this extreme lack of munitions, Ho Chi Minh composed a 
poem in 1947 that was distributed to each province:  
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No matter young or old 
man or woman, everyone 
must wage guerilla warfare 
having no rifles 
we use knives 
we use pickaxes  
we use rakes 
we take shoulder poles 
we pull out hedge rows 




Indeed, the addition use of agricultural tools in fighting off the French was not purely a 
metaphor. At the Military History Museum in Hanoi, there is a large collection of hoes 
and shovels that were used by peasants to attack French soldiers. In addition to these 
agriculture-turn-combat implements are more clever means by which villagers killed the 
foreign occupants of their villages. On display in the museum is a ceremonial wine jug 
that Moc Chau Son La poisoned to kill 12 French soldiers. The French had been invited 
into the village to participate in a ceremonial ritual as a false show of cooperation. 
Villagers also resorted to more conventional, albeit still primitive compared to French 
technology, means of fighting the French. As late as 1952, crossbows were still being 
employed by ethnic minority villages to attack enemy troops, and on display at the 
museum was a famous crossbow used by Trieu Van Khin in 1950 to kill five French 
soldiers marching through his village. The ability of peasants to kill much better equipped 
soldiers points to a major asset in the resistance's arsenal; namely, they were fighting on 
their home territory. Villagers and guerrilla fighters would use their knowledge of the 
surrounding territory to cause an absolute sense of fear for French and American soldiers 
whenever they left their fortified bases. 
                                                 
54
 Ho Chi Minh Museum, Hanoi 
 29 
 Over the course of the resistance movement, Vietnamese guerrilla fighters and 
villagers waged as much of a psychological war as they did a physical, combative war. 
As mentioned above, the ability for fighters to blend into the populace continually 
frustrated both major powers. Creating an environment where the enemy never could feel 
at ease was thus deemed essential to the movement, as it would force a more hasty 
withdrawal: "The aim of guerrilla warfare... consists in picking the enemy off gradually, 
fighting so as to prevent them from enjoying their meal, or having a good sleep... wearing 
them out materially and spiritually until their fighting spirit is annihilated"
55
. The only 
place that guerrilla warriors had access to French and American soldiers was when they 
were travelling on the road or on patrol in villages. Villagers and locals would often be 
aware of these routes, and place numerous traps and bombs along them. When I 
interviewed To Thong, member of the Viet Minh who fought from the earliest stages of 
the resistance in Hanoi, he laughs with some nostalgia at some of the methods his unit 
employed against the French: "We were ordered to trung doc chien (be a bacteria) for the 
French for as long as possible... we would often hide grenades and mines in buffalo dung, 
and set them off when convoys came past". Additionally, villagers and guerrilla 
combatants would fashion useless pieces of metal to look like mines, causing the French 
waste time, men, and material circumventing these illusions. Tactics such as these no 
doubt created an intense sense of fear among French soldiers, for once they stepped out 
of their bases, anything could be a possible weapon or trap. Because local citizens and 
guerilla fighters knew the lay of the land extremely well and set the traps themselves, 
they were able to avoid these traps very well. More so than bombs, old-fashioned hunting 
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traps served as the guerilla movement’s ultimate psychological weapon, especially for 
American soldiers. 
 Seventy-five kilometers northwest of Saigon lay the famous Cu Chi tunnel 
system, a two hundred and fifty kilometer network of tunnels that served to house Viet 
Cong soldiers and the local populace. The site, now a historical tourist destination, 
contains a wide variety of booby traps employed throughout the fields of Cu Chi. Most 
were simple, camouflaged swinging trap door mechanisms that let victims fall onto some 
formation of spikes. Many of these traps must have taken hours to dig, and could 
obviously only be used once, as they would have been covered over once discovered. Mr. 
Tran Huu Chan, the current director of the site, told me that these booby traps served 
primarily as a psychological weapon: “The purpose was to make the soldiers afraid of 
walking around… the aim was to wound the soldier, not kill, so that he would call out 
and his friends would hear his screams”. These booby-traps also served as tactical 
weapons, diverting and concentrating important enemy resources. As Mr. Tran explained 
to me, “doctors and medics and other soldiers would have to come help the friend to 
remove him from the traps. This made for good targets to ambush and fire upon.”  Being 
attacked by guerrilla forces while trying to extricate a fellow soldier from a viscous 
booby-trap most have had a profound effect on the psyche of the American soldier, and 
this was absolutely the intention of the revolutionary forces. By making war as viscous 
and unpredictable as possible, the hope was that the American soldiers would lose their 
combat psyche and begin to question the government policy in Vietnam:  
 
Ho Chi Minh also advocated attack on the morale of enemy troops. He 
considered most of the enemy troops as victims, forced to serve as cannon 
fodder in order to protect the interests of the colonialist system, In his opinion, 
these troops were an important force that needed to be awakened so that they 
 31 
could recognize the difference between the just and the unjust war, between the 
righteousness and the unrighteousness and lay down their arms and return to 




The use of booby-traps in Vietnam was extremely profuse, which must have had a great 
effect on American morale. By Mr. Tran’s estimates, a single acre of land in the 
expansive Cu Chi battlefield may have contained as many as four or five of these hand-
dug death-traps. Though the villages served as the frontline for much of the wars, an 
equally important part of the resistance effort were the crucial supply routes linking north 
to south during the American war, built and maintained for the most part by women. 
 The Truong Son Supply Route, more commonly referred to as the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail, was a network of roads, paths, and rivers running through Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia that served to deliver troops and supplies to the south. The Communist Party 
of North Vietnam commissioned the trail in 1959, and due to the need for physically fit 
men to serve in battles, young women were selected to help maintain, expand, and guide 
soldiers along the trails. In the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, Ho Chi Minh 
cites the American Declaration of Independence but replaces one key word: “All the 
peoples on the earth are equal from birth”
57
. Ho Chi Minh strove to create a society equal 
not just for all classes, but for all sexes. Nowhere was this goal realized more than on the 
Truong Son Trail; women worked as equally hard as their male counterparts, and earned 
an equal amount of respect. Though women were utilized on the trail instead of fighting 
on the front lines (though some guerrilla fighters, and even commanders, were women), 
they suffered just as much hardship as their male infantry counterparts. Senior Lieutenant 
General Nguyen Huu An wrote that “those men and women working in the realm of 
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transportation along the Truong Song range had to face hardship and dangers no less than 
the infantrymen in the battlefield”
58
.  
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was heavily bombed during the American war, and 
women were always at the ready to repair it to keep supplies flowing towards the south. 
In her book Even The Women Must Fight, historian Karen Gottschang Turner writes how 
the Ho Chi Minh trail became the closest thing to a “gender-neutral environment” in 
Vietnam: “Gender was not the criterion for distributing tasks, and the sources show that 
women were involved in every aspect of work”
59
. Because of the sense of imminent 
death at all times while working on the trail, gender differences were put aside, as every 
single able-bodied person was needed to maintain the southward flow of equipment. 
Many Vietnamese Generals have claimed that the organization and efficiency of the 
Troung Son Trail was one of the key reasons the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army 
were able to apply enough constant pressure to force the American withdrawal. The 
group of four female veterans I that interviewed in Hanoi all had worked on the Troung 
Son Trail, starting when they were seventeen years old, the minimum age for entrance 
into the military (though anyone who volunteered was accepted almost regardless of age), 
and worked on the trail until the end of the war in 1975. All four women recall that 
though they had to march less distances than men, they worked themselves to the same 
level of exhaustion as the men. When I asked if any of them had any regrets about 
spending so much of their youth doing hard labor, the answer is unanimous: “We were 
always happy on the trail, even in hard times, because we were striving toward a just 
goal… We always sang to stay happy, and you couldn’t hear the bombs when we sang. 
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We thought that if you feared the bombs, then they would surely kill you”. These 
incredibly brave women were praised extensively by the Communist Party, many 
receiving the title of hero of the nation. Their importance of their job as transport for 
supplies was much lauded to the public during the war. Many of the examples of 
propaganda I came across show strong, resolute women carrying munitions or supplies, 
with slogans underneath saying phrases like “Transport ammunition to liberate country!” 
Ho Chi Minh often claimed that the revolution could only be carried forward on the 
backs of a strong rear support, with every person doing the work of two. The women 
working on the Troung Son trail fully realized this assertion, as the revolution in the 
south was quite literally carried on their backs. It was this unyielding determination by 
every Vietnamese that would prove the revolutionary movement’s ultimate trump card. 
 
V. Unity, Unity, Great Unity; Success, Success, Great Success  
 French and American forces could, as American General Westmoreland said, 
“bomb Vietnam back to the stone age- it’s only a matter of how much punishment the 
enemy is willing to take”
60
. As it turned out, the Vietnamese were willing to take more 
punishment than America could dish out. Though revolutionary forces may have lacked 
the technological and material advantages of their foes, they had an overwhelming supply 
of spirit, and an unequivocal belief in their cause. All of the veterans that I interviewed, 
male and female, said that they never for once believed that victory was unattainable, 
despite the incredible hardships they had to endure. When speaking to Jean Sainteny, the 
French commissioner of northern Vietnam, shortly before hostilities broke out between 
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the Viet Minh and French, Ho Chi Minh stated that “if we must fight, we will fight. You 
will kill ten of my men while we will kill one of yours. But you will be the ones to end up 
exhausted”
61
. Though Ho Chi Minh calculation turned out to be extremely understated, it 
no less denoted the absolute determination of the Vietnamese revolution. No matter the 
losses, Vietnam was resolute throughout the entire struggle with French and American 
forces. Every single Vietnamese fighting or supporting the resistance knew in their heart 
that they would outlast the occupying forces. This resolution brought about an incredible 
sense of unity among every person in Vietnam. Without this unity, determination, and 
unfailing spirit of the people, the war would have been surely lost for the revolutionary 
forces.  
 As mentioned previously, the American war created an intense amount of 
hardship for the Vietnamese people. Yet despite it all, Vietnamese were still willing to 
take up arms to fight an overwhelmingly powerful army. Familial ties are a strong part of 
Vietnamese society, and the quest to defeat American troops and force them out of the 
south was often thought of as a quest to liberate ones own brother. Many of the veterans 
that I talked with describe that they all ‘answered the call of the south’ when they joined 
the army. The ‘call of the south’ was seen as a distress call of a brother, and it became the 
responsibility of every North Vietnamese to rescue their brothers in the south. By 
answering this call, every single person in the army also became spiritual brothers with 
each other. There was a great deal of affection for all members of the resistance, no 
matter the rank or distance between them. To this day, all Vietnamese still affectionately 
refer to Ho Chi Minh as ‘Bac Ho’, which mean Uncle Ho. When I interviewed Nguyen 
Cao Phan and Loung Phuc, both veterans of the American war, they began to tear up 
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when speaking about General Vo Nguyen Giap. General Giap’s health has been in 
decline for the last few years, and his proximity to death caused these battle-hardened 
veterans to weep, as if he were a member of their family. It is hard to imagine the average 
American GI in Vietnam weeping for LBJ or Nixon. Despite having never met Giap, both 
soldiers say that they never felt distant from him, and that the war unified them all under 
one cause. This unity was persistent throughout the war. One of the major orders that Ho 
Chi Minh gave to commanders in the field was that they should be as close as possible to 
their troops: “If the soldiers have no rice to eat, no warm clothes to wear, no place to 
sleep… the commander should not eat his fill, keep himself warm, or sleep soundly”
62
. 
Additionally, when rice supplies began to dwindle during the American war, Ho Chi 
Minh ordered that everyone, regardless of rank, had to plant 1,200 cassava plants. 
President Ho himself even kept a garden of the plants.
63
 Ho Chi Minh’s extremely 
modest lifestyle as well served to strengthen the bond between all levels of the resistance. 
While president of North Vietnam during the war, Ho Chi Minh lived in a small, simple, 
two room house on stilts, one room for working, and one room for sleeping. When I 
visited the house, it was quite a strange feeling to realize my hotel room was bigger than 
President Ho Chi Minh’s entire living space. By having all members, from the top down, 
share in the same experiences of the war, the revolutionary forces created one solid, 
immovable mass of people and spirit. 
 The belief that the Vietnamese could outlast the French and Americans carried 
with it the notion that the future, despite the hardships of the present, would be a much 
more pleasant time. This notion of a better tomorrow was what fueled many of the 
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revolutions supporters, and was echoed in Ho Chi Minh’s Testament, published 
posthumously in 1969: “Our mountains will always be, our rivers will always be, our 
people will always be; The American invaders defeated, we will rebuild our land ten 
times more beautiful”
64
. The promise of tomorrow allowed millions of Vietnamese to 
endure incredible hardships. In particular, the tunnels of Cu Chi were some of the most 
arduous places in all of Vietnam. According to Mr. Tran, as many as sixteen thousand 
soldiers and ten thousand villagers could be living in cramped spaces of the tunnels, most 
tunnels being about two feet wide by 3 and a half feet tall. During intensive combat and 
bombing periods, people could spend as much as a week underground without surfacing, 
and many people spent over ten years living in the tunnels. The length of time spent by 
some people in these tunnels is a total testament to absolute will of the Vietnamese to 
endure and outlast the American army. When I toured the tunnels with Mr. Tran, I found 
it hard to stay below the surface for half an hour, let alone ten years. The air quality was 
extremely poor, the constant crouching hurt my back, and the seemingly endless expanses 
of darkness before and behind me were very trying psychologically. The sense of 
claustrophobia in these tunnels was extremely overbearing. Additionally, many of the 
tunnels were booby-trapped, and people had to memorize the layout completely by 
memory, to avoid information falling into the hands of the enemy. Yet, somehow, people 
endured, and even thrived in these spaces. Several babies were born, raised, and educated 
in this expansive network of bunkers and tunnels. When I asked Mr. Tran about the 
morale of people living in the tunnels, if any got dispirited or committed suicide, his 
answer testified to the inhabitants resolution: “People sometimes were sad, when their 
villages were bombed aboveground. But they knew if they got sad and distracted, we 
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would lose. The people were always thinking of freedom and independence, so they 
could endure anything with their strong mind”. This ability to endure one’s own physical 
and emotional for the promise of freedom and independence points to one of the key 
themes of the resistance: The dissolution of the self in favor of the cause. 
 The most important soldiers to the revolutionary cause were the martyrs, the 
people who had given their life for the continuation of the struggle. Much of the 
propaganda I came across hails these soldiers as absolute heroes, and their stories were 
widely disseminated. The story of Nguyen Noc Nhat, who died fighting off French 
advances to allow compatriots to flee Hanoi, was widely reported, even after he turned up 
alive.
65
 The movement needed people who were willing to endure as much as possible 
without hesitation, and without much support. Soldiers and civilians had to be islands of 
endurance unto themselves, yet all striving towards the same objective. Nguyen Cao Phan 
recalls with some amazement at his stamina endurance while walking the Ho Chi minh 
trail: “I am surprised at how far I walked, and how much I was able to carry, and didn’t 
think of the difficulty. We used to say that the American soldier had eighty people behind 
him, feeding him and clothing him. We had to take carry the whole war on our backs”. So 
long as the entire people were in union, striving for the same goal, the individual could 
endure almost anything to realize that goal. The story of La Van Cau is wholly 
representative that imperative. As I sat in his Hanoi household, the former Lieutenant 
General, an official hero of the country, recounted to me how he lost his arm while a foot 
soldier at the battle of Dong Khe in 1950: 
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The French were very strong at Dong Khe. They had many bunkers and bases, 
and we needed to get through their forces to reach China. Uncle Ho sent a letter 
to my battalion, saying that we absolutely had to succeed to perpetuate the 
revolution. We all took a vow to give our last breath at Dong Khe. I was in a ten 
man group, and our mission was to destroy a bunker so a larger force could pass 
through. My friend and I charged with a twelve kilogram bomb, but as we got 
close, there was a loud sound and much pain, and I passed out. I woke up and I 
thought that I was dead in heaven. I was sad because I was not able to serve 
Uncle ho and the country any longer. But then I heard more gunshots and 
realized I was still in the battle. I sat up and saw that my arm had been shot off, 
and was dangling from my shoulder. I still had not completed my mission, and 
asked my friend to cut off the rest of my arm. He refused at first, but then I told 
him to let me go forward so others are not killed. He consented and cut the rest 
off with a Chinese sword that we had. I ran forward to the bunker, placed the 
bomb, and as I was returning, the bomb exploded and knocked me out again. I 
woke up to the sound of soldiers running past, and was so happy because I knew 




Despite his incredible heroics at the Battle of Dong Khe, Mr. la does not consider himself 
a hero. He cites many other acts of heroism performed at Dong Khe, and says that he was 
only doing his duty. This selflessness shows that an individual’s pain and agony was 
irrelevant in relation to the revolutionary movement. When Mr. La wakes up believing he 
is dead, his first thought is not of himself, but rather his perceived failure at supporting 
and carrying forward the revolution. Additionally, Mr. La told me that he at first regretted 
losing his arm, because he could no longer serve the revolution, but then was happy when 
he received a job teaching new recruits politics and strategy. Vietnamese were always 
willing to serve the cause, no matter what happened to the individual. In Ho Chi Minh’s 
Last Testament, he explains that in dying, “I would have nothing to regret, except not 
being able to serve longer and more”
66
. From the President on down to the common foot 
soldier, the individual’s pain or death did not matter. Only their ability to support and 
carry forward the revolution mattered. People can be killed and infrastructure bombed, 
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but so long as the idea of the revolution existed in the hearts and minds of every 
Vietnamese, no amount of munitions could stop the inevitable march towards victory. 
VI. Conclusion  
 In the purview of conventional warfare, the Vietnamese revolutionary movement 
was perhaps the least equipped force on the planet. For much of the struggle, the forces of 
Vietnam had no air force, no heavy artillery, extremely little rations and supplies for 
soldiers on the ground, and often antiquated, sparse, and obsolete weapons. Additionally, 
the two main opposition forces fought by the resistance were both recent victorious allies 
in the largest conflict in human history. The disparity between the military capabilities of 
the Vietnamese resistance and the French and American armies could not have been 
greater. From the beginning, it seemed that the war was already lost. In an ultimatum 
delivered to the Viet Minh on December 16
th
, 1946, from General Louis-Constant 
Morliere, commander of French troops in North Indochina, stated the dominance that 
opposition forces believed they held over the Vietnamese: “French forces will establish 
order security and order in Ha Noi on the morning of 20 December 1946 at the latest”
67
. 
The French believed it would only be a matter of hours before most of Vietnam was 
under their control. In fact, it would take approximately ten thousand times as long as 
Morliere predict before the conflict was finally over, resulting in a victory for the 
revolutionary forces. This victory was only possible because the Vietnamese created an 
entirely new kind of warfare. Neither bombs, nor bullets, nor losses, and not even death 
were considered important factors of the conflict in the eyes of the Vietnamese. In World 
War Two, the United States dropped 2,057,244 tons of bombs on the Japanese and 
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German war machines, enough to bring about the surrender of each country. In Vietnam, 
the United States dropped just over 7 million tons of bombs, over three and a half times 
as many bombs
68
. Yet the Vietnamese war machine could not be subdued. The only thing 
that mattered to the Vietnamese command was the unequivocal support of the entire 
populace. As long as the people believed in the movement, no amount of munitions could 
deny the independence and reunification of the country. Speaking to the Second Congress 
of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1951, Ho Chi Minh stated the essential principles 
of the Vietnamese resistance, testifying to absolute ability and will of the people to 
endure, outlast, and fight in the face of overwhelming odds: 
 
Some people compare our anti-French resistance to a fight between a 
grasshopper and an elephant! The comparison is true from a narrow-minded 
point of view. The struggle appears to be highly unequal. In our fight against the 
enemy’s air force and artillery, we only have bamboo spikes! But our party 
believes in Marxism-Leninism. We do not merely look at the present: we also 
look to the future. We believe in the spirit of the people, and the strength of the 
nation. And thus, we can give a firm answer to pessimists and the apathetic: 
Today, the struggle seems highly unequal, nothing more than a grasshopper 
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